The 9-11 Commission issued its report, and many in government and in the media demand that its proposals be adopted post haste. Last February, the President formed a bipartisan Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction [web site] to look into where, why, and how the intelligence went bad on Saddam and his WMD. They are due to report in March.
NRO states editorially that intelligence reform ought to wait until the full story is known, and this includes the WMD Commission’s report.
This has been an emotion-driven process on the parts of Congress, the media, and many commentators and observers. The rhetoric used by the proponents of the jot-and-tittle adoption of the 9-11 Commission’s recommendations is almost pure emotion. And for Kean and Hamilton, and the other 9-11 Commissioners, there is clearly a legacy motive.